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Thrfol~wing edited euerpg isporn t h ~  amicus curiae briefjled in 
- .: ''Crawford v. Washington, heard befire the US Supreme Court on 
. ,  - 
. - . November 10,2003. (An elaborated form ofthe brief appears at 2004 
tamationid J o w d  of Evidence and Proof 1-30.) Law School 
Fisher, '97, (ne stories on page 33 and page 76) argued 
6ehaIJlfofCrdYtrford. f i e  t v i a m s  written by Ralph WAigler Profrsr 
Law Richard-fi ~ f f d m a n ~ D o v i d  A. Moran, '9I. Assistant Projkor 
,hat W ~ n e  Stare Law School, wm ofcornel. Anmng the signatories are 
%~rc$ssrror $Law ShermanJL Clark and Assoics'ate Dean& Clinical Afdirs 
McCorma& both ofthe Law School faculty. At deadline time, the 
noajgt onnneuncr4 tcr dds ion  in the case. 
,+& .(;, - . 
rd D. ~rie&ai, - 
L ike Lee v. Illinois, 476 US. 540 (1986), a d  BLly v. Virginia, Bs 5 27 U.S. 1 1 6 (1 999), t&s case is arn example oftwhat mighi be called station-hauae tetimony. Sylvia Qradord, the 
petitioner's wife, made a tape-recorded stzitanent to investigating 
officers at the police station on the night of the alleged lime. 
Sylvia was &willing to tea* at bid against her husband, and 
was deemed by all parties to he un5tdable as a witmess. Over 
petitioner's objection, Sylvia's statement was introduced, and 
petitioner was convicted. Amid file &is brief to address &second 
Question Resented in the petition fpr.cerri~mi: , 
"Whether this COW should reevaluate 8[h] Can$rontation 
Clause framework establidwdin Ohio v. hberts, 448 U.S. 5.6 
(1 980), and hold that the Clause uequivocally probibits the 
admission of out-of-court &tternenl% insofar aa they are contained 
in 'testimonial' materials, such- taperwarded custodial mate- 
ments." 
Summary of argument 
By granting ccrtiorori in this case, the Court has created an 
opportunity to replace an unsatisfactory conception of the 
Confrontation Clausc with one that is historically well grouncled, 
textually faithful, intuitively appealing, and straightfor\varrl in 
application. This conception confines the Clause to its proper 
sphere and at the same time makes clear thc place of the confron- 
tation right as one of the funrlamcntal cornerstones of our system 
of criminal justice. Adopting this conception will also make the 
la\v Sar easier than current doctrine for the lower courts to follow, 
hccause the Confrontation Clausc decisions of this Court will be 
explained by rcfcrcncc to a rohust, easily understood principle 
11-it11 deep roots in the Anglo-American tradition and, indeed, 
thi-oughout Western jurisprudence. This principle is that the 
testimony of a witness may not be used against an accused unless 
it was given under the conclitions prescribed for testimony, among 
which are that it be under oath or affirmation, that it be given in 
the presence of the accused, and that it be subject to cross-esami- 
nation. 
Implementation of the principle rcquires recognition that 
a statement may be testimonial in nature even though it was 
not made under the conditions prescribed for testimony. Thus, 
a statement made knowingly to authorities accusing another 
person of a crime is clearly a testimonial statement - even 
though it was made without oath or  cross-examination and in 
Like the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial, the rieht 
to confront witnesses is subject to waiver, and it is also subject 
to forfeiture, for the accused has no grounrl to complain if his 
own wrongdoing causes his inability to confront the witnecs. Like 
those other rights, the right to conh-ont adverse \vitnecses can and 
should be applied unequivocally. That is, if the statement is a testi- 
monial one and the right has not been waived or forfeited, then 
the right ~hould apply without cxceptions. This simple approach 
is possible because the scope of the right, properly conceived. 
is quite narrow. It docs not reach out-of-court statements in 
general, but only those that are testimonial in nature. 
Under the currently prevailing doctrine, by contrast, the 
scope of the Clause is extremely broad: Any hearsay statement 
made by an out-of-court declarant is presumptively excluded 
by the Clause. A flat exclusionary rule of such breadth would be 
impractical, and so the doctrine exempts from the presumptive 
rule many statements that are deemed to be reliable - purport- 
edlv so reliable that cross-examination would be of little value. 
Statements that fit within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are 
deemed reliable lvithout more. Just which of the many hearsay 
exceptions - a term used in this brief to cover both excep- 
tions proper to the rule against hearsay and exclusions fi-om the 
definition of hearsay - are considered to be "firmly rooted" is a 
question that this Court has only partially resolved. On  an ad hoc 
basis, the Court has declared hearsay exceptions, or  part of them, 
Even if a statement is deemed reliable, 
the Confrontation Clause may bar its 
use if the declarant is available to be 
a witness. 
the presence of no one hut the authorities. If a report by the 
authorities of a statcment made in this way may be considered 
by the trier of fact, then a system has been created that tolerates 
the giving of testimony behind closed doors. The very point of 
the Confrontation Clause was to prevent the creation of such a 
system. That a statement was made absent the conditions required 
by the system for testimony does not render the statement non- 
testimonial in nature - rather, if the statement was testimonial 
in nature, the absence of those conditions renders the testimony 
intolerable. Put another way, the Confrontation Clause gives 
the accused more than a right to confront "all those ~ l l o  appear 
and give evidence at trial." (Cal!fornia I: Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 
[I9701 Harlan, J . ,  concurring). Its primary impact is to ensure 
that prosecution witnesses do give their cvidence at trial, or if 
necessary at a pretrial at which the accused is able to 
confront them. 
either within that category or not, but the Court has never offered 
a clear set of criteria for determining what makes an exception 
"firmly rooted." If a statement does not fit within a "firmly 
rooted" exception, it may yet satisfy the reliability requirement, 
if the statement is deemed to have "individualized guarantees of 
trustn~orthiness."This standard is hea\-ily fact-bound and demands 
case-by-case review. Even if a statement is deemed reliable, the 
Confrontation Clause may bar its use if the declarant is available 
to be a witness. As with reliability, the criteria for the unavail- 
ability requirement are unclear. If the statement falls \vitl~in the 
cxception for former testimonv, the declarant must be unavailable 
or the Clausc will preclude its use; if the statement falls within 
the cxccptions for spontaneous declarations, statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment, and conspil-ator declarations, 
unavailability is not required; in other contexts it is not yet kno~\-n 
whether the unavailability requirement applies. 
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This framework is unpredictable and overcomplicated, and 
so it too frequently yields very bad results in the lower courts. 
The f r a m e ~ ~ o r k  is capable of producing good results; indeed, 
adopting the approach proposed in h s  brief would not require 
the Court  t o  overrule any of its Confrontation Clause decisions. 
But tlle esisting framework reaches good results consistently only 
if i t  is manipulated. In this respect, it resembles the Ptolemeian 
astronomical system.That system, too, was capable of yielding 
good results, but only if it was manipulated and made ever more 
complex t o  ensure that its results matched empirical observa- 
tions. Ultimately, the system failed to explain coherently the 
phenomenon it was trying to describe. Because the system's 
predictive power was thus limited, it became necessary to  adopt 
a new organizing principle. In the confrontation context, too, a 
new organizing ~ r i n c i p l e  is necessary: Rather than treating the 
Confrontation Clause as a generalized attempt to  exclude unreli- 
able hearsay etidence, the Court should r e c o p z e  that the Clause 
is a guarantee that testimony offered against an accused must be 
given in the manner prescribed for centuries, in the presence of 
the accused and subject t o  cross-exan~ination. 
Argument 
I.The text of the Confrontation Clause supports a testimo- 
nial approach to the Clause, and not the Roberts framework. 
We begin with the text of the Confrontation Clause. It provides 
in simple terms: In all criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall 
enjoy tlie right . . . t o  be confronted with the xvitnesses against 
him ." 
Now compare h o ~ v  this language squares respectively with the 
prevailing framework established by Roberts and with the testimo- 
nial approach proposed here. The prevailing framework was laid 
out by Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. As subsequently modified, it has 
these principal elements: 
1 .  "[Wlhen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-exanii- 
nation at trial," use of the hearsay declaration is presumptively 
barred by the Confrontation Clause. 
2 .  Even though it  is hearsay, an out-of-court statement may be 
admitted against an accused (subject to the possible applicability 
of an unavailability requirement) if it is sufficiently reliable. Under 
this doctrine, statements are deemed reliable if the evidence 
either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or "contains 
'particularlized guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adver- 
sarial testing \vould be expected to  add little, If anything, to  the 
statements' reliability." (Lilb, 527 U.S. at 124-25, quoting in part 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.) 
In short,  the Roberts framework depends on a set of concepts 
-hearsay, reliability, and exceptions -none of which is 
supported by the text of the Confrontation Clause. 
hi contrast, that text squares very well with the testimonial 
approach, the core of which may be expressed as follows: Use 
against an accused of the statement of a witness - that is, a 
statement that is testimonial in nature - violates a right of the 
accused unless the accused has or has had an adequate oppor- 
tunity to  confront the witness. A subsidiary principle is that if 
the accused has had an adequate opportunity to  confront the 
witness at an earlier time but, without fault of the prosecution, 
the ~vitness is unavailable to testify at trial, tllen the witncss' prior 
statement may be used. . . . 
II.The history underlying thc Confrontation Clause 
supports a testimonial approach to the Clause, and not the 
Roberts frame~vork. 
If an adjudicative system is rational, then it must rely in large 
part on the testimony of witnesses and prescribe the condi- 
tions under which they may testify. For many systems, one such 
condition is that testimony must be given under oath. Another 
common condition, characteristic of the common law system but 
not limited to it, is that testimony of a prosecution witness must 
be given in the presence of the accused, subject to  questions by 
him or on his behalf. 
Once the irrational methods of medieval adjudication, such as 
trial by ordeal and by battle, withered away, Western legal systems 
developed different approaches to  testimony. Continental systems 
tended to take testimony on written questions behind closed 
doors and out of the presence of the parties for fear that the 
witnesses would be coached or intimidated. In contrast, beginning 
in the 15th century and continuing for centuries afterwards, 
numerous English judges and commentators -John Fortescue, 
Thomas Smith, Matthew Hale, andWilliam Blackstone among 
them - praised the open and confrontational style of the English 
criminal trial. 
To be sure, the norm of confrontation was not always 
respected. First, a set of courts in England followed continental 
procedures rather than those of the common Precisely for 
that reason, they were politically controversial, and most of them 
(notably the Court of Star Chamber), being viewed as arms of an 
unlimited royal power, did not survive the upheavals of the 17th 
century. . . . Perhaps most significantly, in politically charged cases 
the Crown, trying to control its adversaries though the criminal 
law, sometimes used testimony taken out of the presence of the 
accused. Thus, the battle for confrontation was most clearly 
fought in the treason cases ofTudor and Stuart England. Even 
early in the 16th century, treason defendants demanded t l~a t  
witnesses be brought before them; often they used the term 
"face to face." Sometimes these demands were heeded, but what 
is most notable is that they found recurrent legislative supports, 
acts of Parliament repeatedly requiring that accusing witnesses be 
brought "face to face" with thc accused. By the middle of the 17th 
centur): the battle was won, and courts routinely required that 
treason witnesses testify before the accused and be subjected to  
questioning by h m .  
The confrontation right naturally found its way to America. 
There, the right to counsel developed far more quickly than in 
England, and with it  an adversarial spirit that made confronta- 
tion especially crucial. The right became a particular focus of 
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.4mcrican concerns in the 1760s when the Stamp Acts ant1 othcr 
Parliamentary regulations of thc colonics pro\ridcd for thc cxami- 
nation of \vitncsscs upon interrogatories in certain circumstances. 
Nnt  sur~x-isingly, the earl\. statc constitutions guaranteed thc 
confrontation right. Somc uscd thc timc-honorcd "facc to facc" 
I;,rmula; others, follo~ving Halc and Rlackstonc, adopted languagc 
strikingly similar to that later uscd in thc Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clausc. 
This account has not mentioned rcliahility. Though one of thc 
atlvantagcs pcrcci\lctl for confrontation was its contribution to 
truth tlctcrmination, thc confrontation right was not considered 
contingcnt. inapplicalde upon a judicial dctcrmination that the 
prticular tcstimony was unrcliablc. 
Similarly, the la\v against hearsay has not playcd a role in this 
account. Hearsay law, likc evidence law more generally, was 
not lvcll dc\~clopecl at thc time thc Clause was adoptcd, much 
Confrontation guarantees openness of proccdure, which among 
other henefits ensures that the witness' testimony is not the 
product of torture or of milrlcr forms of coercion or intimidation. 
Confrontation provides a chance for the defendant, personally 
or through counsel, to dispute and explore the kveaknecseq in 
the \vitness' testimony. 
Confrontation discourages falsehoocl as \ire11 as assists in its 
detection. Thc prospect of testifying undcr oath, subject 
to cross-examination, and in the presence of the accused, 
makes false accusation much more difficult than it would be 
other\vise. 
If, as is usually the case, the confrontation occurs at trial or  in a 
videotaped proceeding, the trier of fact has an opportuni? to 
assess the demeanor of the witness. 
Confrontation eliminates the need for intermediaries, and 
along with it any doubt about what the witness' testimony is. 
lcss during the previous ccnturics. In exprcssing a fundamental 
proccclural principle govcrning how tcstimonv must be given, 
thc Clause was not meant to constitutionalizc the law of hcarsav. 
The Roberts framcwork is a lattcr-day construct, with 110 historical 
roots. 
111. Thc testimonial approach reflects values warranting 
constitutional protection, and the Roberts framework does not. 
Whcn the statement is testimonial, the question is not 
simply an evidcntiary one, \vhethcr the particular statemcnt 
should be included in the body of information prescnted to the 
tricr of fact. Rathcr, therc is no\v a basic proccdural issue, of 
how tcstimony against an accuscd shall be given. And therc is no 
doubt that tllc constitutional dcmand is that such testimony be 
qiven facc to face wit11 the accuscd, subject to cross-examination. 
Insisting on such confrontation as the required method for givlng 
testimonv servcs several important instrumental purposes: 
The confrontation right 
naturally found its way to 
America. There, the right to 
counsel developed far more 
quickly than in England, and 
with it an adversarial spirit 
that made confrontation 
especially crucial. 
IV. As compared to the Roberts framework, the testimonial 
approach gives better guidance to the lower courts, is more 
practical to implement, and is less susceptible to manipulation. 
The testimonial approach can be articulated in terms of four 
basic questions. 
1 .  First, was the statement testimonial in naturc?The statement 
falls within the scope of the Confrontation Clause if and onlv if the 
answer is affirmative. It is clear that Sylvia Crawford's statement 
to the police M-as testimonial, under an!. rcasonahle approach.The 
statemcnt was electronically recorded by the police in a police 
station after the incident at issue. Thc recolading was made with 
considerable ceremonv, clearly for use in later proceedings, and 
Ms. Cra~rrford spoke in rcsponse to questioning much as if in a 
deposition - hut without oath or cross-csamination. If statc- 
ments madc in such circumstances arc allo\ved as proof at trial, 
then under anv plausible view the declarant is testifying \vhen she 
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made such a statement, for there is no doubt that a reasonable 
person in her position would anticipate that her statements would 
likely be used as evidence in a future criminal proceeding. 
Just as in this case, the question of whether a given statement 
should be considered testimonial can usually be rather easily 
resolved, as indicated by the following "rules of thumb": 
A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim of a 
crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether 
made directly to the authorities or not. 
If, in the case of a crime committed over a short period of time, 
a statement is made before the crime is committed, it almost 
certainly is not testimonial. 
A statement made bv one participant in a criminal enterprise to 
another, intended to further the enterprise, is not testimonial. 
And neither is a statement made in the course of going about 
one's ordinary business, made before the criminal act has 
occurred or with no recoLgnition that it relates to criminal 
activity. 
Thus, testimonial statements include not only statements 
made as testimony at the trial itself, but also testimony given at a 
prior trial or other judicial proceeding, and statements, like the 
one in this case, knowingly made to investigating authorities or 
with the understanding that they will reach and be used by those 
authorities. Inevitably, some cases remain near the borderline, but 
that in itself is not troubling. 
2. Assuming the statement is testimonial, the second basic 
question is: Will the accused have had an adequate opportunity 
to confront the witness? In some settings, this question poses 
interesting issues, such as whether the witness may testify via an 
electronic connection to the courtroom, whether an opportunity 
to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing suffices for purposes 
of the Confiontatiorl Clause, or whether the witness' memory 
loss at the time of cross-examination unduly impairs the accused's 
confiontation opportunity. Usually, though, the answer to this 
question is clear, as it is here; Michael Crawford did not have an 
opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia. 
If the accused \vill not have had an adequate opportunity 
to confront the witness, then introduction of the testimonial 
statement to prove the truth of what it asserts violates the 
accused's confrontation right unless the answer to the third 
question is in the affirmative: 
3.  Did the accused waive the right to confrontation by failing to 
object, or forfeit it by misconduct?The accused might forfeit the 
right, for example, by intimidating the witness, kidnapping her, 
or  murdering her. An accused cannot complain about this inability 
to confront the witness if it is his ovm wrongful conduct that 
created that inability. This principle - rather than the fiction that 
cross-examination would be practically useless anyway because 
a declarant would not wish to die with a lie on her lips - best 
the admissibility of certain statements by dying witnesses. 
If the testimonial statement was made at an earlier time, and 
the accused then had an adequate opportunity to conhont the 
witness, a fourth question arises: 
4. Has the witness been shown to be unavailable to testify at 
trial? If the answer is negative, thcn the statcmcnt may not bc 
used, because live testimony is possible and prcfcrrctl. If thc 
answer is affirmative, ho\vever, the Confrontation Clausc poses 
no obstacle to admissibility of thc statcmcnt, unless thc prosccu- 
tion's wrongdoing causes the unavailability. Taking thc testimony 
at trial would be ideal, but the ideal is not possible; an oppor- 
tunity for confrontation is what is essential, and the accused has 
had it. 
Conclusion 
Current doctrine relies on hearsav law to do the work that 
should be performed by the Confrontation Clause, and this 
has been detrimental to both. It has made hearsay la\&. overly 
rigid, and it has obscured the meaning of the Clause. Once it is 
recoLgnized that the scope of the Clause is narrower than that of 
hearsay law, and that it applies only to those statements that are 
testimonial in nature, the essence of that right becomes apparent: 
It protects one of the central procedural aspects of our system 
of criminal justice, the presentation of testimony in the presence 
of the accused and subject to cross-examination. That right may 
be waived or forfeited, but it is not subject to exceptions nor 
can it be trumped by a judicial determination that the particular 
statement at issue is reliable. 
R icha rd  D. Friedman, 7 --!?!E 
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